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COULD A CLASSICAL THEIST BE A PHYSICALIST?
William F. Vallicella

Since physicalism is fashionable nowadays, one should perhaps not be too surprised to find a growing number of theistic philosophers bent on combining
theism with physicalism. I shall be arguing that this is an innovation we have
good reason to resist. I begin by distinguishing global physicalism (physicalism about everything) from local physicalism (physicalism about human
beings). I then present the theist who would be a physicalist with a challenge:
Articulate a version of local physicalism that allows some minds to be purely
material and others to be purely immaterial. After examining the main versions of local physicalism currently on offer, among them, type-type identity
theory, supervenientism, emergentism and functionalism, I conclude that none
of them can meet the challenge.

God and the soul are two ideas that traditionally "go together."
Logically, however, there is no prima facie inconsistency in positing one
without the other. McTaggart famously denied God while affirming the
souV whereas some contemporary theists, van Inwagen for example,
deny the soul while affirming God. 2 We will have our plates full if we
confine our attention to the second denial-affirmation pair. Are theism
and physicalism ultimately co-tenable positions?3 Can one hold, with
better than prima facie logical consistency, both that there exists an omniqualified creator of the universe, a necessarily existent pure spirit, and
yet that we creatures are not embodied spirits, but purely physical
beings?
l. Physicalism Global and Local

One thing is clear. If physicalism or materialism4 is so defined as to
imply the view that every concrete entity is physical, then theism and
physicalism cannot both be true: God is a concrete, but not a physical,
individuaP Here is David Lewis' stab at a definition: "Roughly speaking, Materialism is the thesis that physics - something not too different
from present-day physics, though presumably somewhat improved - is
a comprehensive theory of the world, complete as well as correct."" For
Tim Crane, "Physicalism is the thesis that all entities - whether objects,
events, properties, relations or facts - are, or are reducible to, or are
ontologically dependent on, physical entities."? If physicalism characterFAITH AND PHILOSOPHY
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ized along these lines were true, it is clear that theism would be false,
and contrapositively.
But this article cannot end just yet. For physicalism might be, and
sometimes is, taken more narrowly as a local response to a local problem, the mind-body problem. This is the problem of specifying the relation between the mental and the physical processes and states of those
relatively few entities that pre-analytically are taken to have both. Van
Inwagen, for example, tells us that "The thesis that human beings are
physical things is called physicalism."8 Similarly for Thomas Nagel: "The
view that people consist of nothing but physical matter, and that their
mental states are physical states of their brains, is called physicalism (or
sometimes materialism)."9 Along the same lines, Galen Straws on says
that" According to materialism, every natural thing is wholly physical."'0 It is plain that these definitions do not rule out theism. If, for
example, every natural thing is wholly physical, this is prima facie compatible with there being a supernatural thing which is not physical at all.
We therefore need to distinguish between physicalism as a general
ontological thesis to the effect that every entity, or perhaps every concrete entity, is physical, and physicalism as a special ontological thesis
about those relatively few bodies that exhibit mentality. Call these global physicalism (GP) and local physicalism (LP), respectively. What
exactly the thesis of local physicalism amounts to will of course depend
on which version of local physicalism is being proposed. But every version of (LP) involves the idea that the mental states and properties of
physical beings are in some way necessarily "tied to" (identical with,
supervenient upon, realized in, emergent from, composed of...) the
physical states and properties of those same beings. (LP) thus appears
sufficiently latitudinarian to allow the existence of nonphysical minds.
For it talks only about the mental states of minded bodies (bodies that
exhibit mentality), and says nothing about the mental states of disembodied minds, if such there be. What it implies is that substance dualism is false for minded bodies: minded bodies are not metaphysical
composites, but simply physical systems. But (LP) does not rule out
substance dualism in general since it allows for minds without associated bodies, and so allows for God and angels.
So far, then, theism and local physicalism are prima facie co-tenable.
Although (GP) entails atheism, (LP) does not appear to entail (GP), and
so does not appear to entail atheism. What I want to argue, however, is
that the appearance of co-tenability dissipates under closer scrutiny.

II. Some Theologically Useless Physicalisms
The problem for the theistic friend of physicalism is to find a way to
be selectively physicalist, physicalist about embodied minds, but not
about disembodied ones. To put it another way, the problem is to find a
way to contain local physicalism so that it does not go global. The theist
who would be a physicalist must find a theory that is physicalist about
embodied minds while allowing for disembodied minds.
Some write as if there is no particular difficulty here. Peter Forrest takes
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physicalism to be "the thesis that necessarily there could not be ... imitation
human beings, namely molecule-for-molecule replicas of ourselves that
lack consciousness." I I He goes on to say that physicalism so characterized
is "obviously compatible with theism."12 But is it? No doubt it is prima facie
compatible with theism, but is it ultimately compatible?
Note first that although physicalism about human beings entails the
"no conscious replica" thesis, the former cannot be identified with the
latter. Physicalism about human beings is not merely the view that such
appropriately configured hunks of matter as functioning human brains
cannot fail to be conscious, but that human consciousness ontologically
and not just causally depends on matter. That is, (i) a functioning human
brain (with the normal sensory inputs, etc.) is metaphysically sufficient
for human consciousness, and (ii) a human brain (or some suitable physical replacement thereof) is metaphysically necessary for human consciousness. (i) is a determination thesis to the effect that the physical
features of an organism determine or "fix" its mental features; (ii) is an
ontological dependency thesis to the effect that it is metaphysically
impossible that (human) consciousness occur without a physical substratum. To omit claim (ii), and to let physicalism ride entirely on the
determination thesis, is to allow the metaphysical possibility that my
consciousness exist without being embodied. To call this "physicalism"
would be a misuse of terms. For it would be indistinguishable from a
form of substance dualism. Suppose I am a spirit contingently lodged in
a human body. During my bodily tenure, my ordinary consciousness is
determined by the functioning of my brain and central nervous system
such that an exact replica of me could not fail to be conscious. But at
death and during mystical experiences in life I qua spirit enjoy forms of
awareness not determined by the functioning of any physical system.
Surely no one will want to call such a view "physicalism" even though it
implies that I cannot have a molecule-for-molecule replica that lacks
consciousness.
So let us charitably supplement Forrest's definition with the ontological dependency claim, claim (ii) above. I will now argue that if consciousness in humans is onto logically dependent upon a physical substratum, then consciousness in general is also so dependent.
Forrest cogently argues that the modal operator in his definition
should be taken to express metaphysical and not merely nomological
necessity, where metaphysical necessity is distinguished from both narrowly logical and analytic necessity.13 Granting this, we may however
inquire into the ground of the metaphysical necessity that no human
being or other embodied mind have a molecule-for-molecule replica that
lacks consciousness, and that consciousness in humans be onto logically
dependent upon a material substratum. The ground of narrowly logical
necessities (e.g., "Every byte is a byte") resides in logical form; the
ground of analytic necessities (e.g., "A bit is a binary digit") in meaning;
and that of nomological necessities in laws of nature. Presumably, the
ground of a metaphysical necessity lies in the natures of the entities
involved; in the present case, in the natures of consciousness and matter.
That is to say, consciousness by its very nature cannot occur unless "tied

COULD A CLASSICAL THEIST BE A PHYSICAUST?

163

to" (identical with, supervenient upon, emergent from, realized in, composed of ... ) physical items (substances, events, states ... ). If so, consciousness wherever it occurs, whether in God or Satan or Socrates, is
necessarily "tied" to the physical. For if some minds are by nature
"tied" to the physical, then all minds, including God's, are by nature so
"tied." Deny that and you are either equivocating on "mind" or denying that mentality has an intrinsic nature. 14 But then it is clear that
Forrest's version of local physicalism is not "obviously compatible with
theism." At the very least, what this preliminary skirmish shows is that
there is a serious problem about the ultimate coherence of local physicalism and theism. But now on to the details.
My strategy will be to consider the different versions of physicalism
currently on offer and to see which of them, if any, can be of use to the
selective physicalist. This section dispatches five theologically useless
physicalisms: eliminativism, type-type identity theory, supervenientism,
emergentism, and what may be termed "the constitution view." The following section turns to functionalism which, I believe, holds out the
only hope for the selective physicalist.
A. We may begin by summarily eliminating the eminently eliminable
doctrine of eliminative physicalism according to which mental states
and events enjoy the status of witches, goblins and magnetic effluvia.
This is surely a "lunatic philosophy of mind"15 in that it denies the very
data that inspire a philosophy of mind in the first place. Consciousness
is nothing like phlogiston. 16 In any case, no classical theist could possibly be an eliminativist.
B. Given the crashingly obvious fact that mental phenomena are real,
one way to insure both their reality and their scientific respectability is
to identify them with what are unproblematically real and doubtlessly
respectable, physical phenomena. The type-type identity theorist identifies mental properties with physical properties of the sort instantiated in
our brains. Thus pain is not merely correlated with A-Delta fiber stimulation, but is identical with the latter. This carries the "species-chauvinistic" implication that beings lacking our neurophysiological constitution could never be in mental states. A fortiori, it implies that beings
lacking any neurophysiological, indeed any physical, constitution could
never be in mental states. It is therefore clear that the type-type identity
theory has global implications: it implies the impossibility of disembodied minds, and thus the impossibility of a divine mind. The selective
physicalist can find no purchase here. It would be a contradiction to say
that (i) every mental property is identical to some physical property of
human beings, and (ii) there is a mental property that is exemplified by
a being that has no physical properties. Note also that (i), if true, is necessarily true. Since (i) entails the negation of (ii), the negation of (ii) is
necessarily true. Thus, if (i) is true, then it is necessarily true that there is
no mental property that is exemplified by a being that has no physical
properties. So if type-identity physicalism is true, the existence of God
and angels is impossible. Contra positively, if the latter are so much as
possible, type-identity physicalism is false.
C. Philosophers justifiably uncomfortable with reductive physicalism
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have proposed the nonreductive idea that mental properties are not
identical with, but merely supervene upon, physical properties in the
way in which ethical properties have been thought (by G. E. Moore, R.
M. Hare, and others) to supervene upon natural or descriptive properties. Suppose A and B are both ethically good. It does not follow that
there is anyone natural, non-disjunctive, property with which goodness
can be identified. Perhaps A is good in virtue of being brave and trustworthy, whereas B is good in virtue of being temperate and just.
Goodness is in this sense "multiply realizable." A and B are both good
despite the fact that their goodness is realized by different natural properties. 17 Nevertheless, (i) a person cannot be good unless there is some
natural property in virtue of whose possession he is good, and (ii) if a
person is good in virtue of possessing certain natural properties, then
anyone possessing the same natural properties must also be good.
Given that A-properties supervene upon B-properties, the "supervenience T-shirt" might read: "No A-property without a B-property" on
the front; "same B-properties, same A-properties" on the back. As
Jaegwon Kim puts it, "The core idea of supervenience as a relation
between two families of properties is that the supervenient properties
are in some sense determined by, or dependent upon, the properties on
which they supervene."IS
Kim's preferred way of cashing this out is in terms of strong supervenience. Let A and B be families of properties closed under such Boolean
operations as complementation, conjunction and disjunction. A strongly
supervenes on B just in case:
(SS) Necessarily, for any property F in A, if any object x has F, then
there exists a property G in B such that x has G, and necessarily
anything having G has F.
To obtain the definiens of weak supervenience, we simply delete the final
"necessarily" in (SS). Accordingly, A weakly supervenes on B just in case:
(WS) Necessarily, for any property F in A, if any object x has F,
then there exists a property G in B such that x has G, and anything
having G has F. 19
On (SS), the base properties fix the supervenient properties in a
trans world manner; on (WS) in a merely intra world manner. There is
also global supervenience to consider. A globally supervenes on B just in
case:
(GS) Worlds that are indiscernible with respect to B ("B-indiscernible" for short) are also A-indiscernible. 20
To say that two worlds are B- or A-indiscernible is to say that they share
the same total pattern of distribution of B- or A-properties.
Peter Forrest has argued that global supervenience physicalism is
compatible with the belief in a non-physical, non-contingent god if we
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are willing to make certain speculative assumptions. 21 Given that God
exists in every metaphysically possible world, no two worlds differ in
point of the divine existence. And if God can create only physical things
- this is one of the speculative assumptions - then no two worlds in
which God creates will differ without differing in a physical respect. 22
Thus there appears to be a variant of classical theism that is compatible
with a version of supervenience physicalism. For what global supervenience physicalism says is that if there is a mental difference between
two worlds, then there is a physical difference between them. If God
exists in every possible world, and creates only physical things in the
worlds in which He creates anything, then His existence and actions
never contribute to a mental difference between worlds, and so His existence is consistent with the constraint that (G5) lays down.
But this is unsatisfactory, for several reasons. First, a variant of classical
theism in which God cannot create non-physical things is a variant in
which angels are not even possible. And so Forrest's argument is of no
use to a Christian or an Islamic classical theist who would be a physicalist.
A second and more important reason is that it is unclear what it could
mean for God's mental properties to supervene globally on physical
properties. Consider a pair of worlds in which there are physical objects
but no minds except God. In these worlds the mental properties (=
God's mental properties) globally supervene upon the physical properties because there is no mental difference between the worlds and hence
no mental difference without a physical difference. Now global supervenience is supervenience (in the way in which lias-if" intentionality is
not intentionality), and supervenience is supposed to capture the ideas
of dependence and determination as relations between sets of properties. But none of God's intrinsic properties depends for its instantiation
on the instantiation of any physical property. There is no sense in which
any of God's intrinsic properties need physical properties to realize them.
If this isn't obvious, think of a world in which God exists but nothing
physical exists. And no physical property is such that its instantiation
determines (suffices for) the instantiation of any of God's intrinsic properties. If per impossibile God were not to exist, or exist bare of properties,
the instantiation of no physical property would make Him exist or make
Him have any property. Furthermore, the only sense in which God's
intrinsic mental properties vary with physical properties is the trivial
sense in which, since they do not vary, they satisfy the conditional, "If
there is a variation in mental properties, then there is a variation in
physical properties." Thus there is no non-trivial sense in which God's
mental properties supervene on physical properties, and thus in our pair
of worlds, no non-trivial sense in which mental properties in those
worlds supervene on the physical properties. So although (G5)-physicalism permits the existence of a non-contingent god, this permissiveness is purchased at the expense of eviscerating the concept of supervenience of the notions of dependence and determination that it was introduced to express. (G5) is just too weak and liberal to be of use in formulating nonreductive physicalism.
Along the same lines, and apart from the God question, Kim has per-
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suasively argued that global supervenience is too weak a notion to capture the idea that mental properties are dependent upon, or determined
by, physical properties. 23 For " .. .it is consistent with this version of materialism [global supervenience physicalism] for there to be a world which
differs from this world in some most trifling respect (say, 5aturn's rings
in that world contain one more ammonia molecule) but which is entirely
devoid of consciousness, or has a radically different, perhaps totally
irregular, distribution of mental characteristics over its inhabitants (say,
creatures with brains have no mentality while rocks are conscious)."2'
Kim also points out that " ... global psychophysical supervenience is consistent with there being within a given world, perhaps this one, two
physically indistinguishable organisms with radically different psychological attributes."25
There is a further reason why global supervenience is too weak to be
of use in formulating a serious version of physicalism: it allows for
Cartesian psychophysical supervenience, or what we might call supervenience dualism. For the global supervenience of mental on physical
properties is consistent with the mental properties being possessed by
irreducibly mental substances and the physical properties being possessed by physical substances. There is nothing in the concept of global
supervenience to rule out multiple domain supervenience in the way in
which (55) and (W5) do rule out multiple domain supervenience. 26 That
is, if mental properties strongly or weakly supervene on physical ones,
then necessarily if an individual has a mental property, then that very
same individual has a physical property, and presumably not just any
old physical property, but one that "realizes" the mental property;
whereas if mental properties globally supervene on physical ones, there
is the possibility that the set of possessors of the mental properties and
the set of possessors of the physical properties be disjoint. But this possibility would of course tend to eviscerate the idea that the physical
properties "realize" the mental properties: To say that my mind cannot
have a mental property unless my brain has a physical property, and
that there cannot be a difference in mental properties without a difference in physical properties is not by a long shot to say that the physical
properties "realize" the mental properties. 27 It is merely to say that my
mental properties "co-vary" with my physical properties. If supervenience is nothing more than covariation, then it cannot get the length of
dependence, determination or realization.
This brief exposition of the concept of property supervenience suffices to make it clear that the theistic physicalist can find no refuge in the
fashionable precincts of property supervenience physicalism. Global
property supervenience has been disqualified. And if mental properties
strongly or weakly supervene upon physical properties, then no mental
property can be instantiated by an individual unless there is a corresponding subvenient physical property that is instantiated by the same
individual. On (55)- and (W5)-physicalism, nothing can have mental
properties unless it also has physical properties that "realize" the mental
properties. Since God has no physical properties, the supervenience
physicalist must judge that He lacks the subvenience base necessary to
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support a mental life. Supervenience physicalism thus does not meet
the challenge: it does not allow for some minds to be wholly immaterial
while others are not.
Given that the necessity operators in (SS) and (WS) can be read either
metaphysically or nomologically, one might wonder whether my conclusion is affected if the modal force of the 'can' in the third to last sentence - Nothing can have mental properties unless it also has physical
properties ... - is taken nomologically. If so taken, then there are metaphysically possible worlds in which mental properties are exemplified
without subvenient physical properties. Thus strong nomological
supervenience physicalism, unlike type-identity physicalism, does not
rule out the metaphysical possibility of disembodied mentality. But it
does rule out the possibility of a world in which human mentality is
supervenient on the physical and divine mentality is not. And that is all
I need for my conclusion. The question is whether there is any metaphysically possible world in which some minds are purely material and
others purely spiritual; the question is not whether there are worlds in
which there are disembodied minds.
Kim takes the relata of the supervenience relation to be properties, or
families thereof. But one might also take the relata of this relation to be
individual events and states. For John Searle, "the supervenience of the
mental on the physical is marked by the fact that physical states are
causally sufficient, though not necessarily causally necessary, for the
corresponding mental states."28 In other words, "sameness of neurophysiology guarantees sameness of mentality; but sameness of mentality
does not guarantee sameness of neurophysiology."29 Searle sees the concept of supervenience, insofar as it is relevant to the mind-body problem, as a causal notion, whereas Kim as Searle understands him sees it
as what the latter calls a "constitutive" notion. 3D To illustrate the difference, the supervenience of goodness on natural properties is the former's being constituted, not caused, by the latter.
But however one construes supervenience, whether as a constitutive
relation between properties, or as a causal relation between states and
events, the fact remains that supervenience physicalism is of no use to
the theist who would be a physicalist about human beings. For God has
physical states as little as He has physical properties.
D. Similar remarks apply to emergentism since, as Kim has persuasively argued, emergentism and supervenience physicalism are practically indistinguishable. 3' But here we need to make a distinction between
property-emergentism and substance-emergentism. Kim's discussion
pertains to the former; I will say something about the latter a few paragraphs hence. Kim squeezes property-emergentism into three theses:
[Ultimate Physicalist Ontology] There are basic, nonemergent entities and properties, and these are material entities and their fundamental physical properties.
[Property Emergence] When aggregates of basic entities attain a
certain level of structural complexity ("relatedness"), genuinely
novel properties emerge to characterize these structured aggre-
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gates. Moreover, these emergent properties emerge only when
appropriate "basal" conditions are present.
[The Irreducibility of Emergentsl Emergent properties are "novel"
in that they are not reductively explainable in terms of the conditions out of which they emerge.
As Kim points out, 'M is emergent from P' is just another way of saying
that 'M strongly supervenes on P.'32 Given this, it is clear that supervenience physicalists subscribe to the above trio of theses.
If this is right, then only physical individuals can have mental properties, and this suffices to show that property-emergentism is theologically
useless, and for the same reasons that supervenience physicalism is. But
there is also substance-emergentism to consider. Substances are metaphysically capable of independent existence. So if there are substance
emergents, they are entities capable of existing apart from their emergence base once they have emerged.
William Hasker sketches such a position. 33 Think of a magnet and the
magnetic field it generates. The field is plausibly viewed as an individual or substance emergent rather than as a property emergent. The field
depends for its existence on the magnet but is not a mere epiphenomenon of it: the field causally affects nearby metal objects. So, Hasker
asks, why can't sufficiently complex states and processes in living
organisms generate "conscious fields" {"psychic fields," "soul-fields")?34
E. J. Lowe develops a similar position according to which consciousness is "an emergent feature of biological evolution ... but not itself a biological phenomenon."35 A contrast with Searle will throw Lowe's position into relief. Searle too thinks of consciousness as emergent, but holds
that it is a "biological phenomenon like any other."36 Thus there are two
notions of emergence at work here. Searle calls them, mirabile dictu,
emergencel and emergence2; Lowe makes the same distinction using
"weak emergence" and "strong emergence." For Searle, consciousness
is a causally emergent property of systems of neurons in the same way
that solidity and liquidity are emergent features of systems of
molecules. 37 This is emergencel. Much stronger and not endorsed by
Searle is emergence2: "A feature F is emergent2 iff F is emergentl and F
has causal powers that cannot be explained by the causal powers of a, b,
c.... If consciousness were emergent2, then consciousness could cause
things that could not be explained by the causal behavior of the neurons."38 For Searle, then, consciousness is only weakly emergent and
thus has no independent causal powers. For Lowe, by contrast, consciousness is strongly emergent: it has independent causal powers, and
its possession of such powers is a good reason to ascribe substance status to consciousness. 39 An organism's consciousness, then, is an emergent substance or individual rather than an emergent property or feature. Consciousness may be causally dependent on the brain, but such
dependence is not a good reason to deny substance status to consciousness. One substance can be causally dependent on another without prejudice to its being a substance.
Suppose Hasker and Lowe are right and consciousness in humans is
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strongly emergent (emergent2). Strong emergentism makes for a partial
rapprochement between theism and physicalism in that it allows for the
possibility of the soul's post mortem existence."ll It is metaphysically
impossible that an emergent property continue to exist after the system
from which it has emerged has ceased to exist; but it seems metaphysically possible that an emergent substance continue to exist after the system from which it has emerged has ceased to exist."l
Be this as it may, our central problem is left untouched, since it is
clear that divine and angelic consciousness is not emergent, whether
weakly or strongly. It is analytic that emergence is emergence from a
physical base, and in the case of God and angels classically conceived
there is no physical baseY Moreover, it is analytic that to emerge is to
come into being, and God's consciousness does not come into being. If it
is the nature of consciousness to emerge from sufficiently complex physical systems, then every case of consciousness must be a case of emergence. Thus strong emergentism cannot meet the challenge: it cannot
explain how some minds are material while others are wholly immaterial. But I hear an objection coming.
"One may hold that it is the nature of human (or, more generally,
embodied) consciousness to be emergent while also holding that divine
and angelic consciousness is non-emergent." I reply that this is incoherent. Let me work up to this conclusion in steps. No one will suggest
that while Bill's consciousness is emergent, Phil's is non-emergent. Nor
will anyone say that consciousness in humans is emergent, but consciousness in cats is non-emergent, perhaps because the type-type identity theory is true of them. Nor is anyone likely to maintain that humans
and Alpha Centaurians differ in that emergentism is true of the former,
whereas substance dualism is true of the latter. All such proposals will
be rightly judged to be incoherent. Why exactly? Well, we naturally
assume a sort of Principle of Ontological Uniformity according to which
any metaphysical answers to questions of the form What is X? (where
typical values of "X" are causation, time, truth, existence, consciousness,
etc.) attempt to lay bare the nature of X, a nature which to be a nature
must remain invariant across space, time, and possible worlds.
Now if the above proposals are incoherent, why is it not equally incoherent to suppose that emergentism is true of human beings, but not
true of God and angels? Consciousness is consciousness. If its nature is
such that in some cases it is emergent, then it must be emergent in all
cases. Either every case of consciousness is emergent, or none is.
Similarly, either every case of liquidity is an emergent property of a system of molecules, or none is. It would be incoherent to maintain that the
liquidity of water on earth is an emergent property while the liquidity of
water on Mars is non-emergent, say a property of individual molecules.
Not that this is not narrowly logically possible; it is. But it is also narrowly logically possible that the chemical composition of water has
changed over time, that water in the time of Thales was an element, in
the time of Dalton was HO, and later became H20. What is narrowly
logically possible may be metaphysically impossible, and I should think
it is metaphysically (and not just nomologically) impossible both that the
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emergence status of liquidity vary from place to place and that the
chemical composition of water vary across time.
Another view bearing affinities to emergentism is that of Aquinas as
interpreted by Eleonore Stump. For Stump's Aquinas, "Mental properties are emergent ... insofar as they are features which are dependent on
the configuration and composition of the whole; they are not identical to
the properties of the material parts of the whole, but they emerge from
the properties and dynamic interactions of those parts."41 For Stump's
Aquinas, "the mind emerges from the functioning of the brain ... "45 Is the
mind then an emergent property, or a conjunction of emergent properties? This seems to follow from the two quotations.
Suppose the mind is an emergent property. Several difficulties arise
of which I will mention two. First, it is difficult to see how an emergent
property can continue to exist after the physical system from which it
has emerged has ceased to exist. Indeed I said a while back that such a
thing is metaphysically impossible. Why exactly? Well, you will grant
that an emergent property cannot exist before the systems from which it
will emerge have themselves begun to exist. Thus it would make hash
of the idea that consciousness is an emergent property to say that this
property existed at the time of the Big Bang but had to wait around for
some 15 billion years before it could emerge. Emergence of a property is
not the becoming exemplified of a pre-existent property; it is the coming
into existence of a novel property. Emergent properties cannot exist
unexemplified, whence it follows that an emergent property of a system
cannot exist after systems of that type no longer exist. And so if the
mind (the intellective part of the human soul) is an emergent property,
then the mind metaphysically cannot exist apart from the body.
Aquinas' view, however, is that the soul, and hence the mind, can exist
apart from the body even though this is an "unnatural" state for it to be
in. The first difficulty, then, is that it is impossible to see how the mind
can be a property-emergent and yet be capable of existence apart from
the body.
A second, and more fundamental, difficulty concerns whether or not
it is consistent to interpret Aquinas as an emergentist given that he holds
that "the human soul is different from all other forms that configure
matter" since "It is created directly by God and infused into matter."46 If
"emergence" means anything at all, it means that that which emerges,
whether a property or an individual, (i) emerges from a physical system,
(ii) emerges only when that system achieves the requisite level of complexity, and (iii) does so "automatically," i.e., without any additional
agency. Given this understanding of "emergence," the soul as a form
"created directly by God and infused into matter" cannot be an emergent entity.
Since Aquinas' position is so far from anything recognizable as physicalism - it is perhaps best thought of as a form of non-Cartesian dualism - it does not represent a position in which physicalism and theism
achieve reconciliation.
E. Besides supervenience physicalism and emergentism, there is
another sort of nonreductive physicalism, call it "the constitution view."
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Lynne Rudder Baker takes this line, according to which "persons are
constituted by bodies, but are not identical to bodies."'s Just as
Michaelangelo'S David is constituted by a particular hunk H of marble,
but not identical to H, Smith is constituted by a particular body B, but is
not identical to B. We may grant for the sake of argument that David
and H are not identical. One reason for this is that there are possible
worlds in which H exists but David does not. Think of a world in which
H exists, but no works of art exist. Since David is a work of art, in such a
world H exists but David does not. But if it is possible that H and David
not be identical, then they are not identical. (By the contrapositive of the
Necessity of Identity, to wit, if x = y, then necessarily, x = y.)
Similarly, Baker thinks, there are worlds in which B exists but Smith
does not. Think of a world in which B exists, but does not stand in the
relations necessary to make it a person. A person, no less than a statue,
is the thing it is in virtue of its "intentionally specified relational properties."49 A person, then, cannot be identical to its body.
Without entering any deeper into Baker's position, a rather obvious
objection obtrudes itself: If persons are constituted by their bodies, then
there cannot be a person without a body. Baker says as much: "It is necessary that Smith have a body, but is not necessary that Smith have the
particular body that she actually has."50 But in that case neither God nor
angels/ devils nor the souls of the departed can exist. Obviously, God
and finite spirits are persons without bodies. The "constitution view"
thus rules out theism.
This objection is so simple that it may arouse suspicion; but I prefer to
say that here is a case where simplex sigillum veri. Note that we can't just
make an exception for God and the heavenly hosts. Besides being irresponsibly ad hoc, that would involve saying that some persons, namely
us, are essentially embodied, whereas other persons, namely God and
angels/ devils, are not essentially embodied. But that is as incoherent as
saying that some samples of (pure) water are identically H20, whereas
other such samples are not identically H20. Given that water has a
nature, that nature is invariant across time, space and possible worlds.
Given that personhood has a nature, the same holds true of it: if embodiment is essential to personhood, then there can be no disembodied persons. If some persons are essentially embodied, all are. It seems that the
only way to evade the objection is by denying that personhood has a
nature. This brings us to functionalism.

III. Functionalism
If you are tempted to functionalism, I believe you do not need refutation, you need help. - John Searles1

The theist who is also a (noneliminative) physicalist about human
beings is committed to the idea that some token mental states, namely
God's, are distinct from every token physical state, while other token
mental states, namely ours, are identical with physical states. This is a
strange idea made stranger still if you adjoin the plausible view that if x
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= y, then necessarily x = y, and if x is distinct from y, then necessarily x is
distinct from y. How could some mental states be necessarily physical
while others are necessarily nonphysical? That would be to deny that
mental phenomena have an intrinsic nature." Consider an analogy.
How could some cats be animals and other cats be inanimate robots,
even if the latter were behaviorally indiscernible from the former? After
all, it is the nature of a cat to be an animal; hence a robotic "cat" is not a
cat. "Cat" picks out a biological kind, not a functional role. Similarly,
one will be tempted to say that it is the nature of mental states to be
either all of them physical or all of them nonphysical. How could mentality straddle such a deep categorial divide?
The functionalist response will be to deny that mental states have an
intrinsic nature. On (ontological as opposed to semantic) functionalism,
what makes a mental state mental is just the causal role it plays in mediating between sensory inputs, behavioral outputs and other internal
states of the subject in question. The idea is not the banality that mental
events typically (or even always) have causes and effects, but that it is
causal role occupancy, nothing more and nothing less, that constitutes
the mentality of a mental state. The intrinsic nature of what plays the
role is relevant only to its fitness for instantiating mental causal roles,
but not at all relevant to its being a mental state. (You can't make a piston out of chewing gum, but being made of steel is no part of what
makes a piston a piston. A piston is what it does.)
To illustrate, suppose my cat Zeno and I are startled out of our
respective reveries by a loud noise at time t. Given the differences
between human and feline brains, presumably man and cat are not in
type-identical brain states at t. (If you doubt this, substitute for Zeno
Meno the Martian cat or Reno the silicon-headed robot "cat.") Yet both
man and cat are startled: both are in some sense in the very same mental state, even though the states they are in are neither token- nor typeidentical. The functionalist will hold that we are in functionally the
same mental state in virtue of the fact that Zeno's brain state plays the
same causal role in him as my brain state plays in me. It does the same
mediatorial job vis-a-vis sensory inputs, other internal states, and behavioral output in me as the cat's brain state does in him.
On functionalism, then, the mentality of the mental is wholly relational. And as Armstrong points out, "If the essence of the mental is purely
relational, purely a matter of what causal role is played, then the logical
possibility remains that whatever in fact plays the causal role is not
material."53 This implies that "Mental states might be states of a spiritual
substance."54 Here 1 think lies the only hope for the theist who aspires to
be a physicalist about human beings. Recall that the difficulty is to
explain how some minds can be purely material and others purely spiritual (and thus immaterial). If functionalism is true, there can be purely
material and purely immaterial minds and mental states because "the
essence of the mental is purely relational." Thus on functionalism God
and Socrates can be in type-identical mental states even though Socrates'
mental states are token-identical to neural states while God's are tokenidentical to states of a spiritual substance.
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Unfortunately for the selective physicalist, (i) functionalism is a monumentally implausible theory of mind, and (ii) even if true for us, could
not possibly be true for God. It is also worth noting that if functionalism
is false for God, and God is a possible being, then functionalism is false

tout court.
Ad (i). There are the technical objections that have spawned a pelagic
literature: absent qualia, inverted qualia, the "Chinese nation," etc.
Thrusting these aside, we go for the throat Searle-style.
First, functionalism is threatened by a fundamental incoherence. 55
The theory says that what makes a state a mental state is nothing intrinsic to the state, but purely relational: a matter of its causes and effects.
In us, these states happen to be neural. Now every neural state has
causes and effects, but not every neural state is a mental state. So the
distinction between mental and nonmental neural states must be
accounted for in terms of a distinction between two different sets of
causes and effects, those that contribute to mentality and those that do
not. But how make this distinction? How do the causes/ effects of mental neural events differ from the causes/ effects of nonmental neural
events? Equivalently, how do psychologically salient input/ output
events differ from those that lack such salience?
Suppose the display on my monitor is too bright for comfort and I
decide to do something about it. Why is it that photons entering my
retina are psychologically salient inputs but those striking the back of
my head are not? Why is it that the moving of my hand to adjust the
brightness and contrast controls is a salient output event, while unnoticed perspiration is not?
One may be tempted to say that the psychologically salient inputs are
those that contribute to the production of the uncomfortable glare sensation, and the psychologically salient outputs are those that manifest the
concomitant intention to make an adjustment. But then the salient
input/ output events are being picked out by reference to mental events
taken precisely not as causal role occupants, but as exhibiting intrinsic
features that are neither causal nor neural. The functionalist would then
be invoking the very thing he is at pains to deny, namely, mental events
as having more than neural and causal features.
Clearly, one moves in a circle of embarrassingly short diameter if one
says: (i) mental events are mental because of the mental causal roles they
play, and (ii) mental causal roles are those whose occupants are mental
events.
A second fundamental objection to functionalism, equal in Searlean
brutality unto the first, is this. If fitting into a causal pattern is what
makes a state mental, then two scenarios which seem possible are really
impossible. In the one, a person's conscious experience gradually fades
out, while sensory input and behavioral output remain the same. In the
second scenario, there is blooming, buzzing conscious experience but
paralysis blocks its behavioral manifestation. As noted, on functionalism both scenarios are impossible. For if the mentality of a mental state
is just its functional role, how could conscious experience fade out as
long as that role was being instantiated? And how could conscious
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experience continue to occur, if all causal links to behavioral manifestation were severed?
But presumably both scenarios are metaphysically possible. Indeed,
there are cases in which the second is actual. And so Modus Tollens
assures us that functionalism is false. This is quick, I know, but details
are available elsewhere. 56
Ad (ii). Even if the above objections can be successfully met, it will
still remain impossible for functionalism to be true of God. A functionalist analysis cannot succeed unless inputs and outputs can be specified.
In the case of human beings, the difficulty was to specify, in a noncircular way, which of the sensory inputs and behavioral outputs are psychologically salient. But in the divine case, the problem is far worse: it is to
explain how God can have inputs and outputs at all.
What is God's input? Since input is a causal notion, God can have an
input only if He can be acted upon, which is not at all clear, and is positively ruled out on some classical conceptions of God. And even if He
were acted upon, He could not be acted upon by any physical object or
process. You can't send a light signal to God. The divine input cannot
be a sensory input. If God is acted upon by some such purely spiritual
means as a mortal's petitionary prayer, then physicalism about human
beings has been abandoned. But even if the problem of the divine input
is solved, other questions arise.
What is God's output? It cannot be bodily behavior, since God has no
body. But perhaps a body is not necessary for behavior. Perhaps God
behaves by intentionally bringing about states of affairs, by creating a
world for example. 57
But now consider a possible world W in which God exists but creates
nothing. There must be such a world since God as traditionally defined
- and that is the definition of "God" with which we are working necessarily exists but contingently creates. 58 In W there is no divine output. But there is no divine input either. All there is in W is God and
"abstract objects," numbers, (Fregean) propositions and the like, all of
which are plausibly identified with divine concepts. So all there is in W
is God alone with His thoughts. 59 With a bit of Aristotelian exaggeration, we may say that all there is is noesis noeseos. In W, God neither acts
nor is acted upon. Now if functionalism were true, God would be in no
occurrent mental state in W. For on functionalism, what makes a state
mental is nothing intrinsic to the state, but consists entirely in its relations to inputs, outputs and other internal states. The being mental of a
state precisely is its occupancy of a causal role that mediates between
inputs and outputs. If there are no inputs and outputs, there is nothing
to mediate, no job to do, with the upshot that none of God's states are
mental states. But of course God is occurrently conscious in W - He is
for example occurrently aware of the infinity of mathematical truths,
though not necessarily in the way we are aware of any set of such truths
- and so functionalism cannot be a true theory of the divine mental life
inW.
Now if there is one possible world in which functionalism is not a
true theory of the divine mental life, then there is no world in which it is
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a true theory of the divine mental life. Functionalism, if true, is necessarily true: it is not the contingent thesis that causal role merely happens to constitute mentality, i.e., constitutes it in some possible worlds
but not in others. So whatever may be the case with our mental lives, it
is surely true of the divine mental life that "Ontologically speaking,
behavior, functional role, and causal relations are irrelevant to the existence of conscious mental phenomena."6D
This is also clear from the fact that God is by definition an absolute
mind. God doesn't have a mind or exhibit mentality; He doesn't behave
in ways that allow us to ascribe mentality to Him; God is (identically) a
mind. Moreover, God's being a mind cannot consist in His relations to
other things. For there are possible worlds in which God exists but there
are no other things. But this stands in diametric opposition to functionalism according to which it is precisely relations to other things that
makes mental states mental. If the mind has a relational essence, then
there cannot be an absolute mind, in which case God cannot exist.
Functionalism as a semantic theory, a theory about the meaning of
mental concepts, may be of use in explaining how some mental predicates can be applied univocally to God and creatures. 6l But functionalism as an ontological theory, a theory that purports to tell the whole truth
about what mental states are, is useless for purposes of showing how a
theist can be a physicalist about human beings. Functionalism cannot be
true of God, and so if functionalism is true, God cannot exist.
Contrapositively, if God so much as possibly exists, then functionalism
is false. But if functionalism won't work for purposes of reconciling theism and physicalism, it is not clear that any other version of physicalism
can do better.
There is a final, related point. William P. Alston approvingly points
out that, on functionalism, " ... the point of having knowledge, beliefs,
memories, perceptions, is that they provide us with the information we
need to get around in our environment in the pursuit of goals."n2 This
strikes me as conspicuously false for God as classically conceived and
rather dubious for us, reflecting as it does a behaviorist-pragmatist prejudice that comports none too well with classical theism and the vision of
the human good associated with it. If "point" means ultimate purpose,
then clearly God does not enjoy knowledge for the ultimate purpose of
getting around in the environment as if He were an organism struggling
to survive in a nature red in tooth and claw.'" God presumably enjoys
knowledge for its own sake, not for the sake of some extrinsic end. Nor
is it the case that in us the ultimate purpose of having knowledge,
beliefs, memories and the rest is to facilitate adaptation to our environment and the successful pursuit of goals. These may be proximate purposes of knowledge and the like, and extremely important ones to boot,
but the ultimate purpose of knowledge is to contemplate the truth and
to rest in it. This is the classical view of Aristotle, Augustine and
Aquinas, and I can think of no better.'" The vita activa subserves the vita
contemplativa. The worldly hustle is for the sake of contemplative
repose. Functionalism can make partial sense of the 'hustle' side of our
mental lives, but it is hopeless when it comes to the 'repose' side -
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which is why it cannot accommodate qualia. 65

IV. Conclusion
The punchline is that one cannot just tack local physicalism onto theism and evade the question of how positions so disparate in substance
and motivation can cohere ontologically. One should not overlook the
fact that for the majority of their adherents, physicalism and theism represent competing Weltanschauungen. 66 Physicalists tend to be scientific
naturalists who draw their inspiration from, and pin their hopes on, the
advance of science, a science that Smart says "is increasingly giving us a
viewpoint whereby organisms are able to be seen as physico-chemical
mechanisms ... ," and according to which there is "nothing in the world
but increasingly complex arrangements of physical constituents."h? Thus
Baker sounds like a good scientific naturalist when she writes that "what
we now know about nature renders untenable the idea of a human person as consisting, even in part, of an immaterial soul capable of independent existence."6S But whereas Smart's rejection of both God and the
soul is coherent, even if mistaken, Baker's half-way naturalism and
selective physicalism is, on the face of it, incoherent. It would be interesting to know what marvelous scientific knowledge renders substance
dualism untenable; but if there is such knowledge, it would also tend to
disqualify the dualism of nonphysical God and physical universe.
So the theistic friends of physicalism have their work cut out for
them. It is not enough to argue against dualism,"" or to argue that such
doctrines as the resurrection of the dead do not presuppose dualism.
One must tackle the more fundamental question of how mind can straddle such a deep categorial divide as that between the physical and the
nonphysical. I do not assume that this question cannot be answered, or
that the arguments sketched above are absolutely compelling. I am
merely urging that this is a question that cannot be ignored. 70
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